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Abstract
Emran,  Otsuka, and Shilpi present  an empirical analysis  probability by 1,200  percent. Having  a father in a
of intergenerational  links in nonfarm participation  with a  nonfarm sector,  on the other hand, does not have any
focus on gender  effects.  Using survey data  from  Nepal,  significant effect on a son's probability  of nonfarm
the evidence  shows that the motlher exerts a strong  participation when the endogeneity  of education and
influence  on a daughter's employment choice.  Having a  assets is corrected  for by the two-stage  conditional
mother in a nonfarm sector raises a daughter's  maximum likelihood  approach.  But a moderate positive
probability  of nonfarm  participation  by 200 percent.  The  intergenerational  correlation between fathers  and sons
effects  are truly dramatic for skilled nonfarm jobs.  exists for skilled jobs.
Having a mother in a skilled job  raises a daughter's
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The evolution of income distribution,  inequality and occupational structure  across generations
has attracted  increasing attention  in recent economic  literature.  This renewed interest  reflects  a
widely  shared  consensus  that the existence  of intergenerational  linkages in socioeconomic  status
has profound  implications  for  mobility  (or immobility)  in a society.  Starting  from  identical ini-
tial income  distribution  or  occupational  structure,  the evolution  of two  societies  might  diverge
dramatically  if the strength of intergenerational  linkages  differs  significantly.'  A large body  of
empirical  studies focusing mainly on developed countries finds that intergenerational  correlations
in earnings are positive,  statistically significant and numerically  large,  ranging between 0.2 to 0.5
(for  a survey,  see Solon  (1999)).2  There is also a (relatively)  small empirical literature that  indi-
cates significant  positive correlations  between parents and their offspring in occupational  choices
(see  Dunn and Holtz-Eakin  (2000)  on U.S,  Sjogren  (2000)  on Sweden,  and Chevalier  (2001)  on
UK).  In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  intergenerational  correlations  in  non-farm  employment  in  a
developing  country, Nepal,  with a particular emphasis on the gender  dimension  of these correla-
tions.3 Although  there  is a substantial  literature on the determinants of non-farm participation
(see Lanjouw and Feder (2001)  for a survey),  the issue of intergenerational  linkages has so far not
received any attention.  A vast literature also explores  gender effects  in intra-household  allocation
of resources  in  developing  countries  (Kanbur  and  Haddad,  1994;  Haddinott  and  Haddad,  1995,
Thomas,  1997;  Quisumbing  and Maluccio,  1999).  However,  to our knowledge,  the gender  effects
in intergenerational  linkages  in non-farm participation  have not been analyzed before.
Although so far neglected  in the literature,  the analysis of intergenerational linkages and gender
effects  in non-farm  participation  has important implications  that span a number of policy areas.
'At  one  extreme,  the socioeconomic  opportunities  available  to an  individual  in a society  might  be effectively
determined  by birth  as in a caste system.  At the other  extreme  is a perfectly  mobile society,  in which the  set  of
opportunities  is same irrespective  of the  exogenous characteristics  of an individual,  like  birth, gender,  ethnicity.  It
is often argued  that mobility is much more  restricted  in developing  countries  (see,  for example,  Lam  and Schoeni,
1993).
2As  indicated  in  Solon  (1999),  most  of the  papers  on  intergenerational  income  correlations  focused  on  the
interlink  between  father  and  sons.  Chadwick  and  Solon  (2002)  is  one  of the  few  exceptions  looking  at these
correlations  between  mothers and daughters.
3There are a couple of advantages  in focusing  on occupational correlation instead of income correlation.  First, it
is not fraught with the almost insurmountable  measurement problems in permanent income, the variable of interest
in income mobility studies.  Second,  as Coldberger  (1989)  pointed out early on,  intergenerational  linkages might be
stronger  for  occupation  choice  (relative  to income),  and focusing  on income  correlations  "could  lead  an economist
to understate  the influence  of family  background  on inequality"  (P.513).The available evidence shows that poverty  in developing countries has a gender  dimension;  women
axe  among the poorest  and chronically  deprived segment  of the population  (World Bank,  2001).
At  the  early stages  of development,  access  to  non-farm  employment  can  be  a  way out  for the
poor and  landless people  in general,  and women  in particular,  as has been demonstrated  by the
micro finance  programs like  Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.  A related  but more important  point
is that the bargaining  power of a woman  is likely to be positively  influenced by her participation
in  non-farm  sector  since  much  of women's  work  in  agriculture  remain unpaid.  Access  to  non-
farm  employment  bears  special  significance  as  a way  to ensure  control  over  income  by women,
which  in  turn  has desirable  effects  on  the  intra-household  allocations.4 Notwithstanding  the
benefits  of non-farm  participation  by women,  there  is  a strong  gender  bias  against  women  in
non-farm  participation  in  many  developing  countries  (for  instance,  in  our  Nepal  data set,  the
participation rates in the non-farm sector  are 45  percent for men  and 22 percent for women).5  It
is important,  especially from  a policy perspective,  to understand how much of this gender bias is
due to occupational  immobility caused  by gender-specific  intergenerational  linkages.  If there are
strong intergenerational  linkages in women's non-farm participation as the evidence discussed later
suggests to be the case in Nepal,  this implies that the long run benefits from women's participation
in non-farm sector are likely to be much higher due to the intergenerational multiplier effect.  Thus
the standard cost-benefit analysis that ignores this multiplier effect  is likely to underestimate  the
value of programs  that simultaneously  target  poor women  and  encourage  their participation  in
non-farm  activities.  6
Our focus in this paper  is on the more 'intangible'  determinants  of intergenerational  linkages
4  A  large number of empirical studies in the context  of developing  countries  finds that greater resource control
by women  within the household  leads to  higher  expenditure  on  family welfare  (e.g.  on food),  especially  higher
expenditure  on children  (education,  health etc.)  and woman herself (for a recent  survey,  see World  Bank, 2001).
5For similar evidence from India and Malaysia, see Feder and Lanjouw (2001).  It should be noted that while this
pattern holds in  many African countries as well, in  Latin American  countries,  participation  rates  in the non-farm
sector are significantly higher  for women compared  with men.
6A different  argument that underscores  the importance  of understanding the  intergenerational  linkages  in non-
farm participation  relates to the role of non-farm entrepreneurship  in the structural transformation  of an economy.
A  dynamic non-farm  sector  can  be the  seedbed  for experimentation  and development  of an entrepreneurial  class
that eventually graduates  to industrial activities,  as was the case in Japan's  rise to a modern  industrial state from
late Tokugawa  to Meiji period  (See  Smith,  1988).  The existence  of strong  intergenerational  linkages  in non-farm
participation means that the initial conditions assume paramount  importance,  and the emergence and development
of an industrial entrepreneurial  class  might be severely  constrained when  an economy starts with a tiny non-farm
sector  and a large agricultural  sector.
2in non-farm participation  like role model effects,  learning externalities,  and transfer of reputation
capital.  We explicitly  control  for education, assets,  and network variables in the regressions,  and
the  parental  occupation  variables  thus  capture  the  'intergenerational  linkages'  over  and  above
these more tangible  (relatively  easily measurable)  factors.  To separate  out the effects  of parents
as role  models,  and  of learning  externalities  and  transfer  of reputation capital,  we  also need to
control for genetic ability  transmission which is presumably an important intangible factor  in any
type  of intergenerational  link.  While  it  is very difficult,  if not impossible,  to  find reasonably
good controls  for ability, we use parental and spousal education to control for ability correlations.
The inclusion  of spousal  education is  predicated on the large empirical  literature  on assortative
matching  in marriage market.7 The  econometric results,  using  household  level survey  data from
Nepal,  indicate strong intergenerational  linkages in non-farm participation  running along gender
lines (mother-daughter,  father-son)  if,  following the extant literature,  we ignore the simultaneity
between education and occupation decisions.  The intergenerational correlations  are pretty robust
with  respect to the inclusion of an array  of control  variables.  However,  the evidence  unambigu-
ously  rejects  the null  hypothesis  of exogeneity,  both for education and assets,  in the  non-farm
participation  decisions  of sons.  The estimated  intergenerational  occupational  linkages  become
numerically small and statistically insignificant for sons when endogeneity of education and assets
is corrected  by utilizing  the Two-Stage  Conditional Maximum  Likelihood  (henceforth  TSCMLE)
approach  (Blundell  and  Smith,  1986;  Rivers  and Voung,  1988).  When disaggregated  according
to skill  levels,  there  are evidence  of a positive correlation  between  father  and son(s)  only in the
case  of skilled  jobs,  thus indicating  that  the aggregate  results  are  partly  driven  by the  lack  of
intergenerational  correlations  in  unskilled jobs.  For daughters,  there  is convincing  evidence that
the  endogeneity  problems  are  not  important,  and  that  there  are  strong  effects  of parents',  in
particular  mother's, non-farm  participation regardless  of levels of skill.  Having a mother in the
non-farm  sector raises a daughter's probability of non-farm participation by 200 percent when the
sample  consists of both skilled and unskilled groups.  The effects are truly dramatic  in the case of
skilled jobs; a daughter's probability of being in skilled job increases by 1200 percent if her mother
* 
7We  do  not have  any data on cognitive  tests,  like  Raven's  test.  However,  it is not clear to what  extent  the
results of a very rudimentary test like Raven's can capture  the type of ability correlations relevant  for occupational
choice.
3is employed in skilled job.  The cross gender intergenerational  links  (mother-son,  father-daughter)
in non-farm participation  appear to be unimportant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a conceptual framework
that underpins  the empirical  work presented  in the subsequent sections.  It presents  a systematic
analysis  of possible  sources  of intergenerational  linkages  and gender  effects  in employment  and
occupational  choice.  The Section III describes the empirical  specification,  while the next section
discusses the data and construction of variables.  Section V, arranged  in a number of sub-sections,
presents  the empirical  results.  The  first sub-section  discusses  the preliminary  evidence  and thus
provides a first impression  of the importance of the intergenerational dependence  in the non-farm
participation.  The next subsection  presents  the results  of the empirical analysis  that takes into
account  the potential  endogeneity  problems.  The  following  sub-section  focuses  on  the role  of
skill  differences  in non-farm jobs.  Section VI concludes  the paper with a summary of the main
findings.
II.  The Conceptual  FRamework
To  discuss  the  many  different  channels  of intergenerational  linkages  in a  coherent  concep-
tual framework,  we  use a simple  model  of non-farm  participation that is based on the standard
occupational  choice  model  but  is  augmented  to capture  the  essentials  of the  intergenerational
linkages.8
There are two sectors in the economy:  agriculture  (a) and non-farm sector (n).  There are over-
lapping generations of people, each with a life span of two periods; in the first period (to) they live
with the parents,  and build up human capital  (schooling and/or in-house learning externalities),
and at the beginning of the second  period  (t1)  every person in the economy  decides which sector
to work for.  Each individual is endowed with an innate ability Oi  E  [0, 1] that captures the genetic
transmissions  and idiosyncratic  talents that are relevant  for non-farm  sector.  So the higher  is 6i
the better suited  an individual  is  for non-farm employment.  The intergenerational  linkages may
arise  from  the fact that the genetic  endowments  of a child  ( Oi)  are  likely  to be correlated  with
those of parents.  The other  major sources of intergenerational  occupational  correlations  include
8The model  utilized here  can  be viewed  as an  extension  of the celebrated  contributions  of Becker  and  Tome
(1979 and  1986)  and the recent extensions proposed  in  Sjogren (2000).
4learning  externalities  (learning  by watching  ones  parents  and learning  by doing  through infor-
mal apprenticeship),  role  model effects  (both through induced  preference  change  and revelation
of information  about  the  unknown  innate  ability parameter  Oi),  relaxation  of credit  constraints
through financial transfer,  inheritance  of reputation capital and better access  to a given occupa-
tion due  to the network  created  and  cultivated  by the  parents  working in the same occupation
(For a more complete  discussion  see Becker and Tomes  (1979,  1986),  Mulligan (1997),  Lentz and
Laband  (1983)).
The optimization  problem  faced  by  an individual  i of generation  0 at  the beginning  of first
period (to) is to choose an optimal level of education  (ei) given the information set Q9° summarizing
all relevant information including the estimated innate ability, parental occupation  (dP'),9 and costs
of education  or acquired  ability Ki(ei, dPi).l°  A higher  education  level  increases  the probability
of getting a better paid non-farm job in the next period.  At the beginning  of second period (tl),
he/she takes  the education  level  e,  as given, and solves the optimal occupation choice  problem
utilizing  the  relevant  information  set  Q1l.  Note  that due  to  information  revelation  in the first
period,11 the  information  set  at  the  beginning  of  the occupational  choice  is  richer,  implying
Q° C 1i4.
The  optimal Schooling  Decision:
Let the  possible  education  level  ei  E  [0,31,  Vi  where  S  is  maximum  number  of  years  of
schooling possible.  Each level  of education  induces a conditional distribution  of income  Yi that
incorporates  the optimal  choice  of occupation  in the following period  given the  information  set
Q9°.  Let F(Yil  I ei; 09?)  be the conditional distribution  of second period  income when  individual
i chooses  education  level  ei  given  the  information  set  129.  The  associated  probability  density
function  is denoted  as P(Yil  I  ei; Q12).  The optimal schooling choice  is as  follows:
e,  =  arg max {Ui(Y°P  - Ki(ei, dp)) + 6i  JUi(Yi)P (Yi I  ei; Q9) dYil}  (1)
9We denote the parental variables with the superscript  p.
'0The cost of acquired ability  depends on parental occupation due to in-house  learning externalities.
"There  are many types of information revelation  that might occur during the first period,  like sucess/failure in
formal education might reveal  information about  ones innate ability  Oi,  parental network might expand or contract
etc.
5where  Y4°p  is the first period  income  transfer  from the parents and Ji  is the discount  factor,
and  Ui(.)  is  a concave  utility  function.'2 Among  other  things,  the  optimal schooling  decision
highlights the importance of first period parental transfer as a way of relaxing the credit constraint
for  educational  investment  which  is important  for  non-farm  jobs.  Since  the  non-farm  income
is usually  higher  than that  from  agriculture,  the  financing of children's  education  gives  rise to
intergenerational  linkages in non-farm  participation  if children's  education  is not an inferior good
for the parents.
The above model of human capital choice is built on the assumption that the value of education
derives from the stream of higher earnings it implies in the future labor  market.  However,  there
is  a substantial  empirical  literature  in the  context  of developing  countries  which  demonstrates
that, for girls, education  is geared  more to the marriage  market considerations  rather than  labor
market opportunities  (see,  for example,  Behrman et.  al.,  1999 on India).  If this  is also the  case
in Nepal, then education is  not likely to be endogenous  in the occupational  choice of daughters.
The  Optimal Occupational  Choice
At the beginning of second period,  individual  i takes the accumulation of human capital and
the consequent  estimate  of ability  as  given,  and  optimally  chooses  the  occupation  di  E  {a, n.
Now given  the  information  set  0,1,  a choice  of occupation  induces  a probability  distribution  of
income.  Let F(Yil. I  a; Q!)  denote the conditional distribution of income when individual chooses
agriculture  and the information  set is  Q2l  with the associated  probability  density function P(YI
a;
We define  the expected utility from  choosing agriculture  as:
Vi(a, Q)  JUi(Yi1)P(YC1  I a; Qi)dYi  (2)
Analogously  the expected  utility from  choosing  non-farm sector  is:
Vi (n, Q!) _  Ui(Yi1)P(Yj'  I n;  Q!)d  i  (3)
" 2Genetic  preference  correlations  means that,  on an  average,  the  children  of parents  who  are risk  takers  may
themselves  be more inclined to take risk and  thus become non-farm  entrepreneurs.
6The individual chooses non-farm  employment  iff the following  holds:13
Vi(n, PIl)  -Vi(a,  Q!l)  > 0  (4)
The probability  that  an arbitrary  individual  drawn  from  the population  will decide to work
in the non-farm  sector  is Pr(Vi(n, PI) - Vi(a, Q,)  >  0).  At the heart  of the occupation  selection
process  is the formation  of expectation  about pay-offs  from  different  options using  the informa-
tion set  Ql.  A critical  element  of the information  set is the occupational  choices  of the parents.
The  parental  occupation  reveals  two  types  of relevant  information:  (i)  information  about  ones
own  genetic  endowment  (or  innate  ability),  (ii)  information  about  the  characteristics  of a  cer-
tain occupation.  For example,  if parents  (either  or both)  are successful  (unsuccessful)  non-farm
entrepreneurs,  the estimate of children's ability to be  successful in similar  occupation  will be re-
vised upward  (downward).  Another  important  channel  is that  revelation  of information  might
reduce  the uncertainty  about  the  parental  occupation,  and  thus induce  risk-averse  children  to
prefer  the parental  occupation to other alternatives.  Thus,  the information  revealed  by parental
choices  (and their outcomes)  can influence  children's  occupation decision through their effects  on
the conditional distribution function  of income Yil  giving rise to role model effects  (Manski  1993;
Streufert,  2000).'4  For example,  consider a child's participation decision in non-farm sector.  The
parental  role model  effects due to information  revelation  imply that  the conditional distribution
of income when parents are in non-farm  F(Yil I  n;  nP, Q!)  is stochastically  dominant  (first or sec-
ond  order) over the conditional  distribution  of income with neither  of the parents  is in non-farm
F(Yi'  I  n;  aP,  Qi).  15  Similar effects  on the conditional  distribution  of income  can also  be due to
learning and network externalities and financial and reputation capital transfers from parents who
work  in the better  paid  non-farm jobs.  On  the other hand,  the role model effects  a la Durlauf
that mould the preferences  of children are captured in the utility function.
The model  presented  above identifies  a number of different  sources  of intergenerational  link-
3Assurning that the tie is  broken in favor  of non-farm sector.
14The definition  of role model  adopted so far  in economic  literature  is not uniform.  For example,  while Durlauf
(2000)  defines  role  model  as the influence  of  "characteristics  of older  members"  on the  "preferences  of younger
members",  Manski  (1993)  and Streufert  (2000)  define  it  as  observations  on  older  members  whose  choices  reveal
information relevant  for the choice  of younger members.
1
5Again, the superscript p denotes a parental variable.  For example,  aP  implies that the parents work in agricul-
ture.  Similarly, superscripts  m and  f denote  mother and father respectively.
7ages,  but it  leaves  unexplored  the  sources  of any  gender  effects  in intergenerational  linkages  in
employment  and  occupational  choice.  Why  would  one  expect  the  correlations  to  be  stronger
along gender  lines  (mother-daughter  and  father-son)?  Since  the  transfer of financial  and repu-
tation  capital,  and  network  effects  can  be  reasonably  argued  to  be  largely  gender  neutral,  we
need  to look  for the  answers  in the other  sources  of intergenerational  linkages  discussed  above.
First,  the genetic  transmissions  might have a gender  dimension.  For example,  the preference  of
a daughter  (son)  is  likely to be more aligned with that  of her  (his)  mother  (father)  compared to
that of her (his) father (mother).  Second,  and probably the most important factor behind  gender
effects in intergenerational  linkages in occupational  choices,  is the gender dimension in role model
effects.  The information  revealed  by the choices  (and consequent  outcomes)  of an older member
of a society will be more informative for the choices  of a given younger  member the closer  he/she
is to the younger person in an appropriately defined socioeconomic  space.  The individuals  can be
grouped  together  by partitioning  the socioeconomic  space  according  to different  exogenous  (like
ethnicity,  gender)  or  endogenous  (like  schooling)  characteristics.  The finer  the partitioning  the
more  informative  is the  information  revealed  by  the choices  of a  member  of a given  group  for
the other members  of that same group.  It immediately  follows that,  given the membership  in  a
family,  gender  creates  a finer  partitioning,  and  the mother  becomes  the  natural  role model  for
the daughter,  and the  father  for the son.  This has also  implications  for  learning  by  doing  and
observing as the daughter  (son)  'sees'  and  'hears'  primarily  what  her  (his)  mother  (father)  does
and says.
III.  The Empirical  Specification
For the econometric  estimation,  we  employ  a standard probit  model  taking inequality  (4)  as
the basis for our  empirical  specification.  Specifically,  we consider the binary  response model
I  if  (Yi  =_  Vi (n, Ql)  - Vi (a, f2l)  > O) if  =  (5)
O  otherwise
8For estimation we impose linearity  and assume that the latent variable  yi  is  generated from a
model  of the form
Yi  =Xi 0 + ei  (6)
Where Xig Q,! is a vector  of explanatory  variables and ei is  the idiosyncratic random distur-
bance term.  For convenience,  we partition Xi into four subsets:  (i) Xi,  the elements of which are
individual  specific  characteristics  (like  education  eX,  age,  gender and  marital status)  that influ-
ence the productivity and preference,  (ii) Xip,  a vector of parental characteristics  (mainly parent's
occupation  (dip)  and parental education),  (iii) Xh, a vector of household  characteristics  (house-
hold  size  and  composition,  spousal  education),  and household's  asset  ownership  that  includes
any  transfers  of financial  capital from  the parents,  and (iv)  Xi,  a vector representing  network
variables  like ethnicity,  and measures  of non-farm  opportunities  available  in a village.  When we
explicitly  control  for education  and  assets  along  with controls  for  intergenerational  ability  cor-
relations  ( parental  and  spousal  education),  the  parental  occupation variable  (s)  then captures
any intergenerational  correlation resulting  from  similarities of preferences,  transfer  of intangible
human and other types of capital (learning-  by- watching, reputation  capital etc.)  and role model
effects  due to induced  preference changes  and information revelation.
There are two salient econometric issues that need to be dealt with in order to identify the effect
of parent's occupation on children's occupational  choices.  First and perhaps the most important
concern  is  that the intergenerational  correlation  in occupation  may  result,  spuriously, from the
fact that parents and children may face similar labor market opportunities.  For instance, if both
parents  and children  live  in an  area  with better non-farm  opportunities,  then intergenerational
correlation in  non-farm participation may be an artifact of not adequately controlling for non-farm
opportunities  in the regression.  We  use village  level fixed  effects in the estimation to control  for
non-farm opportunities.16 Second,  according to the theoretical model, investment  in education  in
first period is dependent  on the expected  occupation in the second period, and thus is endogenous
" 6Since  non-farm  opportunities  are often clustered  around  urban areas,  one  can use  distance  to nearest  urban
center  (or a non-linear function of it) as a control  for unobserved  heterogeneity  in non-farm opportunities.  Other
candidate  variables include the observed  level of employment diversification  and average income in a village.  How-
ever,  even with a wide range  of village level  controls,  there  could still  be unobserved heterogeneity  across villages
in terms of non-farm  employment opportunities.
9in the non-farm participation  decision.1 7 Moreover, current  assets of the household  are also likely
to  be endogenous  to the occupations  of the  household  members.  To  deal with the endogeneity
problem,  we employ the Two-Stage  Conditional Maximum Likelihood  (TSCMLE)  approach.
IV. The Data
The data for our analysis  come from the Nepal Living Standard Survey  (NLSS) 1995/96.  The
NLSS consists of a nationally representative  sample of 274 primary sampling unit (PSUs) selected
with probability proportionate  to population size, covering 73 of the 75 districts in Nepal.  In each
of the PSUs,  12 households  were also selected randomly  (16 households  in the Mountain  regions)
providing  a total sample size  of 3373  households.  With an average  household  size  of about  5.6,
the  survey  collected  detail  information  for  18855  individuals.  The  NLSS  is unique  in  the sense
that it  contained  an entire  section  of questionnaire  on parental  information,  including  level  of
education,  sector  of employment  and place  of birth.  The  survey contains  detail information  on
employment  by sectors  and by occupations  at individual  levels.  However,  for those parents  who
do  not  live  in the  household,  or  who are  deceased,  only  four  types  of employment  status were
recorded;  whether  they  were employed  as  wage  labor  in  agriculture  or  non-agriculture,  or  self
employed  either in agriculture or non-agriculture.  Hence  the sample does not allow finer analysis
of occupational  followings  among children.  As an individual is allowed  to record  more than  one
types of employment  at the same time, the employment  status data can be taken  as if indicating
whether  the  person  was  ever  employed  in  non-farm  sector.  However,  data  on  time  spent  on
different  activities are  not available,  precluding  any attempt  to distinguish between  primary and
secondary  occupations.  As  regression  analysis  reported  in  the subsequent  section  indicate,  the
basic results on intergenerational  correlations  in occupation remain  unchanged whether  we focus
on the sample that  includes  observations  reporting multiple  occupations  or on the sample which
focuses  only on those reporting a single occupation.
Of the total individual level sample of 18347 for whom parents can be identified  from the data,
nearly  71 percent  reported  participation  in the labor  force,  but about  20 percent  did not report
" 7Observe  that even though the  education  level  is predetermined  when the  occupational choice  is made,  it can
not  be treated  as exogenous,  assuming that  the value of education  derives  from  future labor market.  Of course,
as discussed  earlier,  in case of girls, the  endogeneity might not be important if the value of education derives  from
assortative  matching  in marriage market.
10any  occupation.1 8 For  the rest  of the  sample  (9417  observations),  10  percent  are  either  child
labor  (less than  14 years  of age, 9 percent)  or too old (more than 70 years of age)  and  thus are
dropped.19 But some  of the parents  of these individuals  did not either  participate  in the labor
force or report their labor force participation,  further reducing the size of the sample.20 Moreover,
a number of the PSUs showed  no employment diversification  which are dropped to avoid perfect
fits in the regression  analysis.  Splitting the  sample between  males  and females,  we end  up with
a final  sample  of  2090  observations  (in  152  PSUs)  for  daughters  and  2948 observations  (in  242
PSUs) for sons.
The NLSS  1995/96  also contains a wide range  of variables  on household  structure, education,
income  and asset ownership  which can be used  as controls in the regression.  They include house-
hold size, composition  of household  (share of female adults, share of children, share of young and
share of old in total household  size)  as well  as individual's marital status and gender.  The human
capital of an individual  is measured  by her/his level of education  and  age.21  The  education vari-
able codes different  levels  of education  (e.g.  0 if illiterate,  1 if literate but no schooling,  and so
on).  We also define a set of dummies (15 to be exact)  depicting the ethnicity of the individual.  Fi-
nally,  we use two alternative  representations  of the most critical variable  in our analysis:  parental
occupation.  First,  we  define a dummy indicating  if at least one  of the parents  was employed  in
non-agriculture  (ne).  Second,  to allow for differential  impacts,  we disaggregate  and define  three
different dummy variables:  (i) whether both parents are  employed  in non-agriculture  (nP), (ii) if
only father was  employed in non-agriculture  (nf) and (iii) if only mother was employed  in non-
agriculture  (nm).  The summary statistics of the explanatory variables  are presented  in appendix
Table A.1.
18A large fraction of those not reporting occupation are in fact  child labor with age  14 years or less.
1 9Note  that the empirical  results  reported  in the  following  sections  remain unchanged  even  if we  use any  other
cut-off age  (e.g.  dropping  those below  20 years of age  and above 65 years  of age  and so on).
20For  8394 individuals  left  in the  sample,  both  parents reported  participation  in  the labor  force  in the  case  of
6874 individuals,  and for rest of the observations,  employment  status of either father  (347  observations)  or mother
(1173) are  missing.  Note that if we use dummies to capture  the missing parental information,  the sample  size can
be increased  but the qualitative  results remain unaffected.
211n addition to human capital,  age captures  any cohort effect  also.V.  Empirical Results
.V.i Preliminary  Results
To gain a feel  for our data, simple statistics on employment  status  of daughters and sons are
presented  in Table  1. Overall, men have a higher probability  of being employed  in non-farm  (45
percent)  compared  with women  (22 percent).  Comparison  of sons and  daughters'  employment
status conditional  on father's and  mother's employment  status reveals that probability  of being
employed  in  the  non-farm  sector  is  markedly  higher  for  both  sons  and  daughters  if  father  or
mother  were employed  in non-agriculture  as well.  However,  mother's  participation  in non-farm
sector  appears  to have  a  larger  effect,  compared  with  father's  non-farm  participation,  on both
sons'  and  daughters'  probability  of participation  in  non-farm  sector.  Moreover,  mothers  seem
to  exert greater  influence  on daughters;  daughter's probability  of non-farm  participation  nearly
doubles  (from 33 to  59 percent)  if mother was  employed  in the  non-farm sector  compared with
the case where father was employed in the non-farm  sector.  In the case of sons, the effect is less
dramatic as probability  of participation  increases  from 59 to 68 percent.
[See  Table 1]
With some indication of positive intergenerational correlations between parents' and children's
employment  status,  we  turn to see  if the  results survive  in regression  analysis.  Starting  from  a
simple bivariate regression  of sons' and daughters' occupations on parental occupations, we take a
stepwise approach in presenting the results,  introducing an array of control variables in subsequent
steps.  This helps to demonstrate the robustness  (or non-robustness)  of intergenerational  linkages
in  non-farm  participation.  The results  from  daughters'  sample  are  reported  in  the  first panel
(column  la to 3b) of Table  2, and  for sons' in the second  panel (from column  4a-6b).  The result
from the  simple  bivariate  regression  in  column  la shows  that parents'  non-farm  participation
has  significant  positive  influence  on daughter's  probability  of participation  in the  same  sector.
Switching the indicator variable for either parent in non-farm employment  from zero to one raises
the probability  of  daughter's employment  in  non-farm sector  from 0.15  to  0.26.  This suggests  a
marginal effect22 of about  0.11  which  is quite large  compared to daughter's  average  probability
22The marginal  effect  is estimated  by holding all other explanatory  variables  at their sample  mean values while
switching the relevant  indicator  variable from  zero to one.
12of participation  in non-agriculture  of 0.22.  The results  for the sons' sample  (column 4a) indicate
equally significant  and positive intergenerational  effect.  Switching the indicator variable for either
parent  in non-farm  employment  from zero to one raises sons' probability of participation in non-
farm sector by 0.15  compared  with sample  average probability  of 0.45.
[See  Table 2]
Columns lb and 4b of Table 2 report the regression results for daughters and sons respectively
in the case when the indicator variable  depicting parental  employment  status is decomposed  into
three different  indicator variables  to allow for differential  impact of father's and mother's employ-
ment status.  The results reveal some interesting differences  in the intergenerational effects between
sons and daughters.  For sons,  results presented  in column 4b of Table  2 suggest that having both
parents in non-agriculture  (n6)  has the strongest  effect with an estimate of marginal effect of 0.25
at sample mean value.  Having only father in non-farm sector (nf) also has statistically significant
(p-value=0.00)  and positive marginal effect  (0.12) on son's employment choice.  But  only mother
in non-farm  sector  (nm)  appears to exert no significant influence  on son's non-farm  participation
(t-statistic=0.48).  These results stand in sharp contrast with results  from the daughter's sample.
For daughters,  having  only  mother in non-farm  sector  (nm)  has the strongest  effect;  switching
the indicator variable Am  from zero to one raises daughter's probability of non-farm participation
by 0.39  which is  slightly  larger  than  the marginal  effect  (0.36)  of having both parents  in  non-
agriculture.  In comparison,  having only father in non-farm sector has no statistically  significant
effect on daughter's  employment choice  (t-statistic=-0.43).  These results  (in columns  lb and 4b)
suggest  that  intergenerational  linkages  may run along  gender  lines  with mother  (father)  having
stronger influence on daughters  (sons) and vice versa.
Regressions  la-lb and 4a-4b  attribute  variations in daughters'  and sons'  employment  choice
entirely  to parent's  employment  choice.  The  estimated positive  correlations  may not necessarily
represent  any  genuine  intergenerational  externality  but may  simply  pick  up  effects  of omitted
factors  such  as non-farm  opportunities  that  influence  both  parents'  and  children's employment
decisions in the  same direction.  The regression  results  using village  level fixed  effects to control
for heterogeneity in non-farm opportunities  are summarized in columns 2a-2b  (for daughters) and
135a-5b  (for  sons).23  The  inclusion  of village  level  dummies leads  to a significant  reduction  in  the
magnitude  and statistical significance  of the estimated coefficients and marginal effects  of parents'
occupational status on son's choice  of occupation.  However,  the effects of either parents  (nP) (in
column  5a) and of both parents (nb)  (in column 5b)  employed  in non-farm sector are still positive
and  statistically  significant.  The  results  for  the daughters  are  again  quite  different  from  that
for the sons.  While there  is a  slight  decline  in the  magnitude  of the estimated  coefficients  and
their respective statistical significance,  the overall results on intergenerational  correlations remain
nearly unchanged.  The effect  of only mother's employment  in non-agriculture  sector  (nm)  is still
the strongest with a marginal  effect  of 0.36 followed  by both parents employed in non-agriculture
(nb) (0.30).  As before,  having only father  in non-farm  sector does not have  any significant  effect
on daughter's  employment  choice.  The slight  changes  in daughter's  results  compared  with the
drastic  weakening  of the  intergenerational  correlations  for  sons  when  village  level  fixed  effects
are introduced  in the regression  appear  to be puzzling  at first  sight.  However,  it  is  not entirely
unexpected  in  a traditional  society such as Nepal  where  married women  leave  their natal family
to join the household  of the spouse,  and hence face labor market opportunities  different from their
own parents.  In most  cases,  sons,  on the other  hand,  tend to  live  in the  same  village  as their
parents,  if not in the same  dwelling.24
The  next  set  of results  reported  in  columns  3a-  3b  and  6a-6b  of Table  2 include  a  large
number of household  and individual level variables  in addition to parental employment  status and
village dummies as explanatory variables.  Access to non-farm jobs frequently depends on personal
networks that often run along ethnic group/caste  (see,  for example,  Dreze, Lanjouw  and  Sharma,
1998).  To capture the variation  in access to non-farm jobs, we  include a set of dummies depicting
the ethnicity  of the individual in the regression.  We also  include  dummies showing if there  is any
short/long-term  migrant in the household,  as migration frequently occurs  on the basis of personal
networks.  A set of household variables including household  size and composition  are also  added to
231f we use travel time to nearest urban center,  village level median per capita expenditure,  and share  of non-farm
employment  in total village  level employment  as  proxies  for non-farm  opportunities,  the regressions  results  imply
larger  and  more significant  positive  impact  of parental  variables  compared  with those  obtained from  regressions
with village  level fixed  effects.
24Although  the tendency  to migrate to urban areas  is relatively higher among men,  the incidence of permanent
migration  is not  significant.  In  our current  sample  about  3.5 percent  of all  households  reported  any permanent
migration  from rural  to urban areas.
14the set of explanatory variables.  As discussed in the theoretical model, human and financial capital
variables  are  important  links  in the intergenerational  transmissions  of socioeconomic  status.  To
isolate  the  effects  of other  'intangible'  factors  that include  the  genetic  transmissions  through
endowment  and preference  and  the role model  effects,  we introduce  human and financial capital
variables  to control  for the 'tangible'  source of intergenerational  correlations.  In addition to the
level  of education  eX,  we  include  age  of an  individual  as a  human capital  variable  representing
the work  experience.25 Total  asset  owned  by the  household  is  also  introduced  as a regressor  to
control  for access to capital.  Transfer income  (remittances)  received  by the household  and travel
time  to  nearest  commercial  bank are  also  included  as additional  controls  for  access  to capital.
We include individual's marital status to account  for taste and/or gender related differences.
In Table 2,  columns 3a -3b  and 6a-6b present  the results  for the daughters'  and sons' samples
respectively  ignoring the existence of potential endogeneity  of human capital  and assets.26 While
individual,  household level and network variables have statistically significant effects on both son's
and daughter's  probability of non-farm participation,  the results  on intergenerational correlations
in occupation improve slightly for sons and remains  nearly unchanged for daughters.  For instance,
having either parent in the non-farm sector raises  son's probability  of non-farm  participation  by
0.09  which  is  slightly  higher  than  the marginal  effect  [0.07]  reported  in  column  5a of Table  2.
The  inclusion  of a  large number  of variables  as additional  controls  does  not  affect  the strength
of parental  influence  on son's and daughter's  non-farm  participation  significantly.  This suggests
that parent's occupation choice  variables  did  not act as proxies  for individual's  human capital or
access  to financial capital or household  and network variables.
[See  Table 3]
25In addition,  age and its squared  term will capture any cohort  effect  also.
2"If  parental occupation  dummies  were  excluded  from these regressions,  3a-3b and  6a-6b (Table 2) would  corre-
spond directly to the standard specification  used in the available  literature  (Ferrira  and Lanjouw,  2001;  Lanjouw,
2001,  Lanjouw and Shariff,  2000).  Consistent with the findings  of these studies,  we find that an individual's  proba-
bility of non-farm participation varies significantly and positively with the level of education  (marginal  effect equal
to 0.07 and p-value=0.0  for daughters and to 0.03 with p-value=0.03  for sons).  Apart from the ethnicity dummies,
having  a migrant  in the household also significantly  improves  son's but not daughter's  probability of participation
in  the non-farm  sector  suggesting  strong  network  effects  in securing a  non-farm job  for men.  On the  other hand,
participation  in non-farm sector varies negatively with household size  in the case of daughters  but has no significant
relationship  with household  size for  sons.  Participation  in non-farm  sector varies  negatively with ownership of as-
sets  (mainly  agricultural  land) implying  some occupational  following  in agriculture.  Ethnicity dummies are jointly
significant  for both  sons and daughters.  Most  of the other variables  have expected  signs  and impacts  on non-farm
participation.
15The results so  far indicate that observed  intergenerational  correlations  between parents and
children  are  not  due  to  'tangible'  intergenerational  linkages,  as the  tangible  sources  like  indi-
vidual's education  and  asset  transfers  from parents  are already  controlled  for  in the  regression.
Among many 'intangible'  sources of these correlations, perhaps most common is the correlation  in
ability of parents  and children due to genetic  transmission.  While it is difficult  to get  indicators
that measures  ability reasonably  well, we introduce father's and mother's education to control for
ability correlations.  As evidence from marriage market suggest prevalence  of assortative matching
(Boulier and  Rosenzweig,  1984),  we  also  include  spouse's education as an additional  control  for
ability.  For un-married  individuals, household  head's  education  is  used  in the place  of spouse's
education.  The regression  results  are  presented  in  column  la-lb  (daughters)  and  3a-3b  (sons)
of Table  3.  Among the  variables  representing  ability  (not reported  in Table  3),  spouse's  edu-
cation  has  positive  and statistically  significant  (p-value=  0.05)  impact  on  daughter's  non-farm
participation.27 In contrast,  the level of mother's education  influences  son's non-farm participa-
tion positively  and significantly  (p-value=0.03).  However,  inclusion  of the variables representing
ability leaves  the results on intergenerational  correlations  unaffected  as obvious from the results
reported  in Table  3.  The results on the strength of the intergenerational  correlations  in occupa-
tion choice  appear to be  robust  to inclusion of a  large number  of explanatory  variables,  and do
not  seem to spring from  tangible  sources of intergenerational  correlations or from  correlations  in
ability.
V.ii:  Endogeneity  of Education  and Assets
The  theoretical  model  and  subsequent  discussion  on  the  empirical  specification  point  out
clearly that the level of education observed in the second period (t1) can not be taken as exogenous
in  the  non-farm  participation  regression  due  to  the  fact  that  the  optimal  education  decision
depends  on  the  expected  labor  market  opportunities.  Likewise,  current  levels  of  assets  of  a
household  are determined  by income and hence occupations of its members and can not be treated
as exogenous.  As mentioned  before,  to deal with the potential  endogeneity  problems,  we utilize
the Two Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood  Estimation (TSCMLE).  At the first stage of the
TSCMLE, the suspected  endogenous  variables are separately  regressed  on all exogenous variables
27The detail regression  results are not reported  in Table 3,  but can be obtained from the  authors.
16in the regression  model  and a set of instruments.  Given that we have two suspected  endogenous
variables (education,  and assets),  we also identify two sets of instruments.  Following Card(2001),
we instrumented education using viUage level average distance to nearest school,  distance to school
interacted  with ethnicity dummies and with inherited agricultural  land.28 For asset ownership by
the household,  inherited agricultural land and its squared term are used as identifying instruments.
The details  of the first stage regression results  are presented  in the appendix Table A.2.  The first
stage regressions  explain a considerable  amount of the variations  in education  and assets  while
avoiding over-fitting.  The adjusted R2 is estimated to be 0.47 (for daughter's)  and 0.49 (for son's)
education equations respectively,  0.58  (for daughter's)  and 0.56  (for son's), regressions  for assets.
Consistent  with the findings  of Card(1995),  Conneely and Uusitalo  (1997)  and Maluccio  (1998),
both son's and daughter's education  vary inversely with distance to nearest school (p-value =0.0).
While distance  to school  interacted  with inherited land  appears to have  no significant  influence
on the level  of education  of either sons or daughters,  distance to school interacted  with ethnicity
is statistically  significant  in explaining  son's education  level.  Consistent  with the expectation,
inherited land and its squared  terms are highly statistically significant in explaining  household's
current  level  of assets  in both son's and  daughter's  samples  (p-value=0.0  in both cases).  The
estimated  coefficients  imply a  concave  relationship  between  asset  ownership  and inherited  land
for  both sons  and  daughters.  The  two  sets  of instruments  are  separately  and jointly  highly
statistically  significant  in  the  relevant  regressions.  The  parental  employment  status  variables
are not statistically  significant  in education  (for both sons and daughters)  or asset equations for
daughters.  Parent's  non-farm  participation  appears  to  have  negative  influence  on  the level  of
assets owned by the household  only in the son's sample.
For the second  stage regression,  the set of explanatory  variables  (including the suspected  en-
dogenous variables)  is augmented with the residuals from the first stage and then probit regression
of non-farm  participation  is run on this augmented  set of explanatory  variables.  A  nice feature
of the TSCMLE  is that the t-statistic on the residual is a valid test of the null hypothesis  that
the  suspected  endogenous  variable  is in fact  exogenous.  The estimated  coefficients  of the  first
28While ethnicity dummies  are already in the structural equation,  if educational attainment varies with ethnicity,
then ethnicity  interacted  with distance to school  still  qualify as strong  instruments.  For detail, please  see Card
(1995).
17stage residuals  and their  respective  t-statistics  are reported  in  the second panel  of Table  3.  In
addition to the  usual test  based  on t-statistics,  we  also  carried  out  F tests  of joint  significance
of the residuals from  the first stage  regressions,  results of which  are reported  in the last panel of
Table 3.  An important advantage of TSCMLE is that even when the null hypothesis of exogeneity
is rejected,  the estimated  coefficients  are consistent,  although the standard  errors and t-statistics
have to be  corrected for  the fact that  first stage  residuals  are  added as regressors  in the second
stage.  All t-statistics TSCMLE  estimates reported  in Table  3 are corrected  for  two-stage  nature
of regressions as  well as for intra-cluster  correlations due to clustered  sampling.
The  results  from  second  stage  regressions  for  daughter's  and  son's  samples  are  presented
in columns  2a-2b  and  4a-4b respectively  (Table  3).  In  the son's  sample,  as  speculated  by the
theoretical  model,  both education  and  household's  level  of asset  ownership  are  endogenous  to
son's non-farm  participation  decision.  The  absolute  t-statistics  on first  stage  residuals  are  2.48
and 3.16  respectively for education and asset residuals in column 4a and 2.56 (education)  and 3.21
(assets)  in column 4b.  The F-tests on the joint significance of residuals from first stage regressions
on  education  and assets  also  confirm  that the  null  hypothesis  of exogeneity  of education  and
assets can  be  rejected  resoundingly  at p-value=0.004  or less  in  both  4a and  4b.  However,  we
get  strikingly  different  results  for  the  daughter's  sample  as  reported  in  columns  2a  and  2b  of
Table  3.  The t-statistics  on residuals  from  education  and asset  equations  indicate  that  none of
the coefficients  of residuals  are  statistically significant  at even  10  percent level.  Indeed, the null
hypothesis  of joint exogeneity of education  and assets  for daughters  sample can be rejected  only
at p-value=0.32  or higher.  The  results  suggest  that problems  of endogeneity  of education  and
assets are not serious  in the daughter's  sample.  As  discussed earlier,  the exogeneity  of education
is not entirely unexpected  in a traditional  society such  as Nepal  where  investments  in daughter's
education  depend  largely  on marriage  market  considerations  instead  of expected  labor  market
returns.2 9 The  exogeneity of assets  may reflect the low  level of participation  by women  in better
paid non-farm jobs,  as it implies that women's  income on average do not have significant  impact
on household's  asset  accumulation.
As  to  the  regression  results  presented  in  the  upper  panel  of Table  3, the  strength  of  the
29For similar evidence from  India, see  Behrman,  Foster,  Rosenzweig and Vishishtha  (1999).
18intergenerational  correlations  remains undiminished in the daughter's sample even after assuming
that education  and assets are endogenous to non-farm participation  decision (columns  2a & 2b).
As  before,  having  either  (ne)  or  both  (nb)  parents  employed  in  the  non-farm  sector  increases
daughtet's probability of non-farm participation  significantly.  However,  having only mother  (nm)
in the non-farm sector has the strongest effect  while only father (nf) has no appreciable influence
on daughter's  probability  of non-farm  participation.  The  estimated  marginal  effects  are  only
slightly  smaller  compared  with  the  estimates  in  columns  la and  lb.  Even  if we  focus  on the
most conservative  estimates  (columns  2a  & 2b),  the intergenerational  correlations  in the case of
daughter  remains  quite substantial.  For instance,  switching  the indicator  variable  representing
either  parents  employed  in  non-farm  sector  from  zero  to  one  raises  daughter's  probability  of
participation  in  non-farm  sector  from  0.15  to  0.24,  providing  an  estimated  marginal  effect  of
0.09.  This represents  nearly  63 percent  increase  in daughter's  probability  of being employed  in
non-farm  sector if either  parent  was  employed  in the  same sector.  The  effect  of  mother's  non-
farm participation  (nm) on daughter's probability is stronger still:  it raises daughter's probability
of being  in  non-farm  employment  by  203  percent.  If  both parents  were  employed  in  non-farm
sector  (nb),  it increases  daughter's  probability  by  169  percent.  These  estimates  suggest  that
intergenerational  correlations  in  employment  choice  is rather  dramatic  for  daughters.  Indeed,
only the level of education  has an impact on non-farm participation stronger than those  observed
for either both parents in non-farm sector (nb)  or only mother  in non-farm sector  (nm).30
In contrast with the results for daughters,  the moderate positive correlations observed between
parents and sons (columns 3a and 3b) turn out to be non-robust once the endogeneity of education
and  assets are recognized.  When  endogeneity of education  and assets  is properly  accounted  for,
the TSCMLE results show that the estimated coefficients  have expected positive signs (4a and 4b),
but their magnitudes  decline considerably  and they are not statistically  significant,  separately  or
jointly.31 The results from exogeneity  tests indicate that expected  occupation plays an important
30The  level  of education has a marginal effect of 0.29  on daughter's probability  of non-farm participation.  This
result  might seem  counterintuitive  given that education  for  girls is not  geared  to  labor  markets.  However,  there
is no  contradiction  here.  The result  only shows that once  a daughter  gets education  the probability  that she will
choose  employment and actually be employed  in  the non-farm sector  is  much higher, whatever  the original purpose
of education might be.
31Endogeneity correction greatly enhances  the impact of education on non-farm participation;  the marginal effect
of education  on non-farm participation  probability  increases  from 0.03  (in 3a & 3b ignoring  endogeneity  problem)
to 0.20 (in  4a & 4b with proper correction  for endogeneity).
19role  in  the decision to  invest  in education  in the  case  of sons  and  son's  incomes  from  non-farm
sources  are  also  important  in  household's  asset  accumulation.  When  endogeneity  of education
and  assets are  accounted for,  parent's non-farm  participation  does  not appear to influence  son's
probability  of participation in the non-farm sector  significantly.3 2
The  results  thus  indicate  strong  intergenerational  linkages  between  mother  and  daughter,
but  the  absence  of any  significant  linkages  between  fathers  and sons  appears  to  be  puzzling,
especially given contrary evidence  in the context of developed countries.  However,  our results are
not inconsistent  with  the existing  literature;  we  also  find relatively  larger  and  more  significant
linkages  for  sons  when  education  and  assets  are  assumed  to be  exogenous.  Thus,  at  least  a
part  of the  weaker  intergenerational  correlations  in occupational  choice  for sons  seems  to have
resulted  from  the  correction  of endogeneity.  Another  possibility  is that  the  non-farm  sector,
as broadly  defined  as in this paper,  consists  of a myriad  of activities  from  unskilled to  highly
skilled occupations,  and predominance  of lower  end and temporary jobs requiring  little skill may
have blurred  the intergenerational  linkages  often reported  for more skilled jobs in the context of
developed  countries.  We  explore the role  of skill composition  more thoroughly  in the following
section.
V.iii:  Skill and Intergenerational  Linkages
We define an indicator variable depicting if an individual is employed in jobs requiring special-
ized skills or not.33 Similar indicator  variables are also defined depicting if parents were employed
in skilled occupations.  Since  many of the parents did not report finer  occupational  details,  the
regressions  were run on a much smaller  sample of sons  (827 observations)  and daughters (494 ob-
servations)  for whom we have complete information.  The results are reported in Table 4, columns
la-2b  for daughters  and  3a-4b for sons.  The regressions  for  the  daughters'  sample  excluded  the
village  dummies  as only  23 villages  have more than  one  women  employed  in  skilled jobs  (total
observation:  67).  Instead  we  use  'share  of non-farm  employment  in total village  level  employ-
32As an additional robustness check,  we drop those individuals who reported multiple occupations (both in agricul-
ture and non-agriculture),  and run regressions similar to 4a and 4b (Table 3), we find results nearly indistinguishable
from  those reported  in Table 3.
33An individual is assumed to be employed in a skilled job if she/he reported any of the following occupations; pro-
fessional  and technical  workers, administrative and managerial  workers,  clerical workers and operators, skilled sales
and  services  workers,  skilled  workers  in agriculture,  production  workers requiring  specialized  skills  (e.g.  machine
operator,  metal processors etc.).
20ment' as  a proxy for the common labor  market opportunities  faced by parents  and daughters.34
The qualitative  results for daughters remain unchanged  from those reported in Table  3. Parents,
particularly mothers,  exert great influence on daughters occupational choice.  The marginal effects
are similar in magnitude  compared  with those reported  in Table  3 (la-2b).  However,  the sample
probability of daughter's participation in skilled jobs is nearly half (0.13) of that in non-agriculture
as a whole  (0.22).  When expressed  in percentage  terms,  the impact  of parent's participation  in
skilled jobs on that of daughters is simply spectacular.  For instance, compared  with the situation
when none  of the  parents  were  employed on skilled jobs, either  parent's  participation  in skilled
jobs raises  daughter's probability of having a skilled job by 650 percent.  Having only mother  in
skilled jobs increases  daughter's probability  by 1200  percent.  Having  both parents in skilled jobs
has yet  stronger  effect;  it raises  daughter's probability  by  1400  percent.  The  intergenerational
positive correlations  are thus much stronger in the case of skilled jobs  for daughters. 35
(See Table  4]
Consistent  with  our  findings  for  daughters,  the  intergenerational  correlations  are  stronger
in  skilled jobs  in the  case  of sons  too.  The  overall  results  for  sons represent  an  improvement
over  that reported  in  Table  3  (columns  3a-4b).  When  endogeneity  of education  and  assets  are
ignored,  we find significant  and positive impact of father's participation in skilled occupations  on
the probability  of sons participation  in similar jobs.  Compared  with the results  for all  non-farm
jobs,  the  marginal  effects  are much  larger  in  magnitude;  having both parents  or only father  in
skilled jobs improves son's probability  by 0.28 and 0.21 respectively.  Since  the null  hypothesis of
exogeneity of education and assets can be rejected at 20 percent significance  level, the appropriate
TSCMLE estimates  (4a and 4b) show that parental  influence on sons' occupational  choice  is only
slightly weaker.  Both 'either parents  in skilled jobs'  (column 4a)  and  'only father in skilled jobs'
34The comparison  of results using share of non-farm employment in total village level employment  as an explana-
tory  variable with  that of the  case  when village  level  dummies are  included  shows  that  the differences  between
these two sets of estimates  are small  in the overall  daughter's sample  (farm vs non-farm  choice).  For instance,  the
implied  marginal  effects  of either parents  in non-agriculture  is  0.07 compared  with  0.10 in column  2a of Table  3
(TSMLE  estimates).  Results for other specifications  (2b, Table 3)  are  also similar.  This suggests that the share of
non-agriculture  in total village level  employment,  is also a good proxy  for labor  market opportunities.
35In addition  to  the  choice  of skilled  vs.  unskilled jobs,  we  also  experimented  with  different  sub-samples  of
daughters to check  robustness  of the linkages.  For instance,  when we  consider  the sample of only  married women,
the intergenerational  correlations are found to be slightly stronger.  Given the tradition of women leaving their natal
family upon marriage and joining spouse's households, the sample of married women can correct  for any unobserved
household  level  factors common to both parents and children residing  in the same household.
21(column  4b)  are  statistically  significant  at  5  percent  or  less.  The  estimated  coefficients  bear
correct signs  and are also large in magnitude.  The implied  marginal effects  are also large;  having
a father in skilled job raises son's probability by 0.21,  which represents nearly a 97 percent increase
in probability  over the  case when  father was  employed  in  unskilled job.  Having either  parents
employed  in skilled jobs  has effect  similar  in magnitude  on son's probability  of being employed
in  non-farm  jobs.  The  results in  Table  4 thus suggest  that  there  are  positive  intergenerational
correlations in occupations  even in the sons' sample  and that these correlations run along gender
lines as observed in the case of daughters'  in non-farm participation  decisions.
To summarize,  intergenerational  correlations  in occupation  choice seem  to be stronger  in the
case of skilled jobs for both sons  and daughters.  As in the case of non-farm occupations  includ-
ing both skilled and unskilled jobs, the correlations  run along gender line but are much stronger
for daughters.  Though  the regressions  control  for  ability  correlations  using  father,  mother  and
spouse's  education  as explanatory  variables,  one  may still argue  that these  are imprecise  mea-
sures of ability.  However,  if the intergenerational  correlations  uncovered  in the previous sections
were primarily  driven by the correlations  in ability of the parents and children,  then one would
expect  similar  magnitudes  of correlations  for  children of different  gender.  The  huge  differences
in the strength of these correlations  between  sons and daughters  suggest  that intergenerational
correlations  observed in our  data are not primarily  due to correlations  of parents and children's
ability.  The results  point more  to the 'role model'  effects and learning  externalities  as a sources
of these  correlations.  Women  in  a traditional  society,  being  brought up within the  confines of
a household,  have their  mother  as their  primary  role  model  with  the  effect that  mothers  have
disproportionate  influence on daughter's  occupation choice.  For sons,  the set of role  models  can
extend well beyond the household,  and while father exerts some influence,  father's impact on sons
occupation  choice  becomes diluted  as education  opens up a richer  menu of occupational  choices
to them.
VI:  Conclusions
Despite the recent surge in interests in the determinants of non-farm participation in develop-
ing countries,  the issue of intergenerational  linkages in non-farm participation  has, to our knowl-
edge, not been addressed in the literature.  A burgeoning literature on socioeconomic  mobility, on
22the other hand, emphasizes  these intergenerational  correlations.  However,  the empirical  research
in  this literature  has  focused  mostly  on  intergenerational  income  correlations  in the  context  of
developed countries. 36 In this paper,  we present some first empirical evidence on intergenerational
occupational  correlations  in non-farm  participation  in a developing  country,  Nepal.
The  empirical  results  show  that  there  are  strong  intergenerational  correlations,  especially
for daughters,  in  non-farm  participation  arising  from  'intangible'  factors  like role  model  effects,
learning  externalities,  and  transfer  of reputation  capital.  The results  of Two  Stage  Conditional
Maximum  Likelihood  analysis  that  correct  for  potential enodgeneity  of education  and  assets  in
the  regressions,  suggest  dramatic  impact  of a  mother's  employment  status  on  daughters'  non-
farm participation  rate.  The probability  of a daughter's  non-farm  participation  increases  by  200
percent  if mother is employed in the non-farm sector, even  after controlling for  a large number  of
relevant  variables  including  education,  assets,  and non-farm opportunities.  The linkage  between
mother  and  daughter  is  especially  strong  in  case  of  skilled  non-farm  jobs,  thus  implying  very
restricted occupational  mobility  for women  out of agriculture  and low skilled non-farm activities.
In contrast, the intergenerational  link between father and son is found to be nonexistent, except for
the case of skilled  non-farm jobs.  The difference  in the strength of intergenerational  correlations
between son-father and daughter-mother  implies that the observed  correlations  in case of mothers
and  daughters are  not primarily  due to intergenerational  correlations  in genetic ability or taste.
Other intangible  factors  such  as  role model  effects  and learning  externalities  are  perhaps  more
important  in determining  these  correlations.  The  much stronger  and positive  intergenerational
correlations  between  mothers  and daughters  also  suggest  the  existence  of a  strong gender  bias
against women in occupational mobility.  Such robust occupational correlations,  on the other hand,
provide a strong argument  in favor  of policy interventions  for promoting  non-farm participation
of  women  due  to the  dynamic  multiplier  effect.  It  will  be  interesting  to see  if the pattern  of
intergenerational  linkages  found in case of Nepal is valid for other developing  countries, especially
in South Asia and Africa where the initial non-farm participation rates are strongly skewed  against
women.
36 Solon  (1999)  in his survey  of studies on intergenerational  mobility cited  only one paper  on income  mobility in
the context of developing  countries;  the paper cited  being Lillard  and Kilburn (1995)  that uses data from Malaysia.
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27Table 1:  Probability of Participation in Agriculture and Non-Agriculture
Father in  Mother in  Unconditional
Agriculture Non-agriculture  Agriculture Non-agriculture
Daughters
Agriculture  0.93  0.79  0.93  0.61  0.91
Standard Deviation  0.25  0.40  0.26  0.49  0.29
Non-agriculture  0.19  0.33  0.19  0.59  0.22
Standard Deviation  0.39  0.47  0.39  0.49  0.41
No.  of observations  1750  403  1927  162  2060
Sons
Agriculture  0.91  0.76  0.90  0.65  0.88
Standard Deviation  0.29  0.43  0.30  0.48  0.32
Non-agriculture  0.42  0.59  0.43  0.68  0.45
Standard Deviation  0.49  0.49  0.5  0.47  0.50
No. of observations  2619  613  2781  229  2948
28Table 2:  Intergenerational  Correlation and Employment in the Non-Farm Sector
Daughters  Sons
(1  a)  (1  b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b)  (5a)  (5b)  (6a)  (6b)
Eitherparentinnon-agriculture(n')  0.41  0.38  0.44  0.37  0.19  0.24
(3.97)  (3.49)  (3.67)  (5.24)  (2.17)  (2.92)
[0.111  [0.10]  [0.10]  [0.15]  [0.07]  [0.09]
Both parents in non-agriculture (n b)  1.05  0.95  0.97  0.65  0.48  0.44
(6.35)  (4.68)  (4.75)  (4.84)  (2.67)  (2.58)
[0.36]  [0.30]  [0.28]  [0.25]  [0.18]  [0.17]
Only father in non-agriculture (n f)  -0.05  -0.05  0.003  0.29  0.12  0.18
(-0.43)  (-0.33)  (0.02)  (3.52)  (1.10)  (1.84)
[-0.01]  [-0.01]  [0.001]  [0.12]  [0.05]  [0.07]
Only mother in non-agriculture (n
m )  1.13  1.10  1.18  0.11  -0.05  0.13
(3.42)  (3.02)  (3.21)  (0.48)  (-0.02)  (0.37)
[0.39]  [0.36]  [0.37]  [0.04]  [-0.02]  [0.05]
Village Fixed effect  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Human, physical,  network capital  &
household characteristics  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes
No of observations  2060  2060  2060  2060  2060  2060  2948  2948  2948  2948  2948  2948
Sample probability  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45
Note.- Entries are probit coefficients.  Standard errors are corrected  for intra-cluster correlations  due to clustered sampling.
t-values are in parentheses and marginal effect of each variable (evaluated  at sample  means) is shown in bracketAII  regressions include an intercept term.
29Table 3:  Intergenerational  Correlation,  Gender and Employment in the Non-Farm Sector
Daughters  Sons
Probit  TSCMLE  Probit  TSCMLE
(1  a)  (1  b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b)
Either parent in non-agriculture (n')  0.45  0.43  0.24  0.15
(3.52)  (2.94)  (2.84)  (1.00)
[0.10]  [0.09]  [0.09]  [0.05]
Both parents in non-agriculture  (n b  0.99  0.97  0.41  0.33
(4.79)  (3.92)  (2.39)  (1.02)
[0.29]  [0.25]  [0.16]  [0.11]
Only father in non-agriculture  (n f)  -0.01  -0.03  0.18  0.1
(-0.05)  (-0.16)  (1.86)  (0.74)
[-0.002]  [-0.01]  [0.07]  [0.03]
Only mother in non-agriculture (n
m )  1.18  1.16  0.12  0.01
(3.16)  (2.12)  (0.04)  (0.03)
[0.37]  [0.32]  [0.05]  [0.01]
Abiliity Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Estimates  from second stage  regression
Residual (education)  -1.1  -1.09  -0.5  -0.52
(-1.34)  (-1.38)  (-2.48)  (-2.56)
Residual (assets)  0.11  0.11  0.33  0.32
(1.04)  (1.04)  (3.16)  (3.21)
Test of Exogeneity
F(HO:  Education & Assets Exogenous)  1.13  1.14  5.63  5.84
p-value  0.33  0.32  0.004  0.003
Note.-  Entries are probit coefficients for Reg 1 and 3 (a&b),  for the rest, entries are Two-stage conditional maximum
likelihood coefficients.  Standard errors are corrected for two stage regressions  and for arbitrary heteroskedasticity due
to clustered sampling.  t-values are in parentheses and marginal effect of each variable (evaluated at sample means)
are shown in brackets.  All regressions  include parental employment dummies,  log of levels of education,  age, age squared,
dummy for married, household size & composition,  assets, distance to bank, un-earned  income, control for ability, dummy
for migrant members,  14 ethnicity dummies, a number of village level dummies,  and an intercept term
30Table 4: Intergenerational  Correlation in skilled jobs
Daughters  Sons
Probit  TSCMLE  Probit  TSCMLE
(1  a)  (I b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b)
Either parent in skilled jobs  0.94  0.96  0.62  0.64
(3.45)  (3.30)  (2.65)  (2.47)
[0.09]  [0.10]  [0.21]  [0.20]
Both parents in skilled jobs  1.56  1.63  0.77  0.70
(3.76)  (3.77)  (1.72)  (1.40)
[0.30]  [0.32]  [0.28]  [0.24]
Only father in skilled job  0.25  0.23  0.61  0.64
(0.69)  (0.60)  (2.42)  (2.28)
[0.02]  [0.02]  [0.21]  [0.21]
Only mother in skilled job  1.47  1.53  0.50  0.48
(3.07)  (3.42)  (0.81)  (0.70)
[0.28]  [0.29]  [0.18]  [0.16]
Test of Exogeneity
F(HO:  Education & Assets Exogenous)  0.06  0.73  1.77  1.72
p-value  0.94  0.48  0.17  0.18
Number of observations  494  494  494  494  827  827  827  827
Sample probability  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.33
Note.-  Entries are  probit coefficients for Reg 1 and 3  (a&b), for the rest,  entries are Two-stage conditional maximum
likelihood coefficients.  Standard errors are corrected for two stage regressiors  and for arbitrary heteroskedasticity due
to clustered sampling.  t-values  are in parentheses and marginal  effect of each variable (evaluated  at sample means)
are shown in brackets.  All regressions  include parental employment dummies,  log of levels of education,  age, age squared,
dummy for married, household size & composition,  assets, distance to bank, un-earned income, ability controls, dummy
for migrant members, ethnicity dumrnies,  a number of village level dummies (for sons' sample only), and an intercept term
Regressions  for daughters include share of non-farm employment in total village level employment
31Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Daughters  Sons
Standard  Standard
Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation
Participation rate in non-agriculture  0.22  0.41  0.45  0.50
Either parent in non-agriculture  0.21  0.41  0.23  0.42
Both parents in non-agriculture  0.07  0.25  0.06  0.24
Only father in non-agriculture  0.13  0.34  0.15  0.35
Only mother in non-agriculture  0.01  0.12  0.02  0.13
Level of Education (Years)
Children  1.76  3.74  4.29  4.82
Father  1.14  2.82  1.19  2.92
Mother  0.14  1.02  0.08  0.77
Spouse  2.45  4.19  0.43  1.90
Age  33.5  13.1  35.7  14.8
Age squared  1294  995  1492  1158
Married  0.79  0.41  0.76  0.43
Household size  6.52  3.23  6.57  3.09
Share of adult female  0.28  0.15  0.23  0.11
Share of children  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.14
Share of Young  0.33  0.21  0.34  0.20
Share of Old  0.03  0.09  0.02  0.07
Travel time to nearest School  0.36  0.37  0.39  0.34
Travel time to nearest bank  2.57  3.68  2.89  3.94
Un-earned income (million Rs)  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.08
Asset (million Rs.)  0.59  1.05  0.49  1.38
Inherited land (value in million Rs.)  0.30  1.09  0.23  0.92
Inherited land squared (value in million Rs.)  1.29  11.45  0.89  9.78
Migrant in the household  0.38  0.48  0.35  0.48
32Table A.2: First Stage Regressions
Daughters  Sons
Dependent variable  Education  Asset  Education  Asset
t  ,B  t  p  t  j3  t
Age  -0.07  -8.09  0.00  0.18  -0.04  -3.99  0.002  0.12
Age squared  0.001  6.31  0.00  0.20  0.00  1.10  4E-05  0.23
Married  -0.18  -3.23  0.01  0.84  0.15  2.73  0.008  0.12
log(household size)  0.11  2.71  0.91  10.93  0.19  3.39  1.06  11.73
Share of adult female  0.30  1.48  0.29  0.76  0.03  0.12  0.26  0.53
Share of children  -0.26  -1.27  -1.06  -2.75  -0.29  -1.59  -1.56  -4.43
Share of Young  -0.10  -0.66  -0.79  -2.41  -0.21  -1.31  -0.81  -2.54
Share of Old  0.08  0.41  0.52  1.31  0.58  2.03  -0.23  -0.54
Travel time to nearest bank  -0.01  -1.29  -0.01  -0.41  0.00  -0.04  -0.01  -0.83
Un-earned income (million Rs)  0.42  1.66  4.20  6.03  0.44  0.84  5.46  9.69
Migrant in the household  0.08  2.46  -0.16  -2.04  0.03  0.67  -0.15  -2.05
Father's education
Literate  0.26  3.58  0.45  5.58  0.56  9.72  0.53  6.33
Primary Education  0.43  5.62  0.24  2.07  0.52  6.04  0.3  3.19
Secondary education  0.69  5.01  0.36  2.32  0.63  6.74  0.78  5.32
Higher than Secondary Education  0.80  3.48  0.57  2.80  0.32  2.21  0.72  4.07
Mother's education
Literate  -0.09  -0.41  -0.80  -3.23  0.08  0.56  0.22  1.42
Primary Education  0.43  1.91  0.48  2.05  0.31  1.51  1.06  3.16
Higher than Primary Education  0.42  1.27  0.87  2.18  0.20  1.22  0.28  0.75
Log(education  of spouse/head)  0.10  4.45  0.18  4.53  0.23  6.21  0.23  4.96
Either parent in non-agriculture  0.02  0.33  -0.02  -0.20  -0.14  -1.09  -0.18  -2.46
Instruments
Av. travel time to school (TSCH)  -0.26  -2.91  -0.27  -2.19  -0.28  -5.71  0.16  1.57
Inherited  land (value in million Rs.)  0.09  1.18  1.17  7.00  0.13  1.43  1.29  9.01
Inherited land squared (million Rs.)  -0.01  -1.15  -0.07  -4.71  -0.01  -2.92  -0.08  -5.36
TSCH*inherited  land  -0.17  -0.92  -0.02  -0.04  0.28  1.32  0.01  0.03
Signicance  of instruments  F-test  P-value  F-test  P-value  F-test  P-value  F-test  P-value
TSCH*ethincity dummies  1.47  0.13  9.57  0.00  1.83  0.03  3.55  0
All TSCH related instruments  1.9  0.02  10.69  0  7.44  0  3.25  0
Inherited  land & its squared  0.72  0.49  25.25  0  7.15  0  48.48  0
R'  0.47  0.58  0.49  0.56
No. of observations  2060  2060  2948  2948
Note: All regressions  include  14 ethnicity dummies. Regressions  for daughters  include  150 village dummies
and that for sons include 241  village dummies. Standard  errors are corrected  for intra-cluster correlations
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